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Abstract. The present paper describes an ‘ontological square’ mapping possible 
ways of combining the domains and converse domains of the relations of 
inherence and denomination. In the context of expounding and extending 
medieval appropriations of elements drawn from Aristotle’s Categories for 
theological purposes, the paper uses this square to examine different ways of 
defining Substance-terms and Accident-terms by reference to inherence and 
denomination within the constraints imposed by the doctrine of the Trinity. 
These different approaches are related to particular texts of thinkers including 
Bonaventure and Gilbert of Poitiers.
Given that the doctrine of the Trinity teaches a mystery that demands 
faith on the part of believers, it can be surprising that in the hands of 
certain medieval philosophers the Trinity becomes a  logical puzzle, 
a puzzle how to reconcile the doctrine with certain tenets of Aristotelian 
philosophy. However, this development did not necessitate abandoning 
the requisite attitude of faith; it just meant that the faith of those who 
pursued this type of investigation was illuminated (or alternatively, 
encumbered) by philosophical theory.
I. BACKGROUND
A key component of the philosophical background to the logical puzzle 
of the Trinity can be found in the account of the various types of terms 
given in Aristotle’s Categories. A privileged class of terms (let us say per 
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se terms) divides into substance-terms and accident-terms. Beyond that 
class there are denominatives. The terms so classified are not construed as 
totally unmediated by language and thought; rather, they are construed 
as already having a certain conceptual content. Thus the terms man and 
the one approaching are different terms, and different types of term, even 
though in some context they stand for the same being.
I  take it that terms are picked out by abstract or concrete nominal 
expressions. But I make no assumptions about the ontological status of 
terms – whether they are mental or linguistic items, or whether they are 
objective entities. I do assume that various relations hold among terms, 
including relations of inherence and denomination. But when we say 
things like ‘Colour inheres in body’ or ‘Coloured is denominated from 
colour’, the truth of what we say is not dependent on the actual existence 
of colours, coloured things or bodies.
Different configurations of inherence and denomination, discernible 
in the text of the Categories, give us necessary conditions for being 
a substance-term, and also for being an accident-term.1
Three necessary conditions for a term A being a substance-term are:
(1) A does not inhere in any term as subject. This is a necessary condition 
of being a substance term, but it is not sufficient because it also applies to 
terms like rational that differentiate one species from another but do not 
themselves characterise a substance.2
(2) A second necessary condition is that A has accident-terms inhering in 
it.3 Aristotle calls this feature the most characteristic mark of substances.
(3) A  third necessary condition is not stated explicitly but may be 
conjectured as assumed in the text. It is noticeable that a differentia term 
such as rational is denominated from an abstract term, in this case the 
quality-term rationality, whereas we do not find any abstract terms in 
the Categories from which substance-terms are denominated. While 
man is a substance-term, no term humanity is mentioned. It seems then 
that a third necessary condition of substance-terms is that they are not 
denominated from any term.
(4) Finally, it is clear that a substance term does not denominate anything.
It seems then that we have three classes of terms as shown in Figure 1.
1 Paul Thom, The Logic of the Trinity: Augustine to Ockham (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2012), pp. 13ff.
2 Aristotle, Categories 5, 2b21.
3 Aristotle, Categories 5, 4a10.
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 Figure 1. Types of term in the Categories
In distinguishing these three types of term, we have appealed to four 
relative states in which a term A can fi nd itself: (1) A  inheres in some 
term, (2) A is inhered in by some term, (3) A denominates some term, 
and (4) A  is denominated by some term. Each of these states can be 
present or absent in a given term. So there are in principle not 3, but 
16 types of term – each one of which is characterised by the presence 
or absence of each one of the four relative states. Th ese types of term 
are shown in Figure 2, together with the locations of the types of term 
recognised in the Categories.
 Not denominated Denominated 
Denominating Denominating Not denominating Not denominating 
Inhering 
Not inhering 
Not inhered in 
Not inhered in 
Inhered in 
Inhered in 
A 
B 
C 
D 
4 3 2 1 
Substance 
Accident 
Denominative  
Figure 2. Th e ontology of the Categories
Other ontologies based on notions of denomination and inherence 
ought to be able similarly to locate the types of term they recognise.
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The class of substance-terms in the Categories can be characterised by 
the following configuration of inherence and denomination: these terms 
are inhered in, they don’t inhere, they are not denominated, and they 
don’t denominate.
Accident-terms share one of these characteristics: they are not 
denominated. We do not find second-order terms like Rationality-ness 
in the Categories. But in respect of the other three characteristics, what 
substance-terms possess accident-terms lack. Thus accident-terms 
inhere in some term, they are not inhered in by any term, and they 
denominate.
Before we proceed it will be useful to make some observations about 
the ways in which terms figuring in the ontology of the Categories are 
inter-related by inherence and denomination.
(1) Every term enters into either a relation of inherence or a relation 
of denomination.
(2) What denominates something inheres in something.
(3) Denomination is irreflexive.
(4) What is denominated is not inhered in.
These observations can be spelt out as follows. Firstly, if we consider only 
substance-terms, accident-terms and denominatives, it is apparent that 
substance-terms are inhered in, accident-terms inhere, denominatives 
are denominated; so in each case the term in question stands towards 
something in a relation of inherence or a relation of denomination or the 
converses of these relations.
Secondly, confining consideration again to substance-terms, 
accident-terms and denominatives, we observe that only accident-terms 
denominate, and only accident-terms inhere; thus what denominates 
something inheres in something.
On observation 3, it might be thought that the irreflexivity of 
denomination is clear from the fact that when Aristotle introduces this 
relation he notes a linguistic difference between the denominating term 
and its denominative.4 But on the other hand, it might be argued that 
this linguistic difference is accidental to the ontological relation between 
denominating and denominated, and that consequently it cannot be 
a sound basis for concluding that the relevant ontological denomination 
is irreflexive. There is, however, another, ontological, argument that can 
4 Categories 1, 1a12.
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be appealed to. Aristotle conceives of the denominated term as being 
derived from the denominating term; and under this aspect it seems that 
the relation must be irreflexive – at least, this is so if a term cannot be 
derived from itself.
Regarding observation 4, it can be argued that (a) only denominatives 
are denominated (and denominatives are not substance-terms), and (b) 
only substance-terms are inhered in (to be inhered in is the mark of 
substance). Against this reasoning it might be argued that sometimes 
an  accident-term inheres in another accident-term. For example, my 
pallor may change in its relational accidents, by spreading more widely 
over the surface of my face. If accident-terms can have accident-terms 
inhering in them, then it is not true that only substance-terms are inhered 
in. However, it remains true that only substance-terms or accident-terms 
are inhered in, and that denominatives are neither substance-terms nor 
accident-terms.
These observations correspond to various possible states of our table. 
Observation 1 would be reflected in a table that has no terms in cell 1A. 
Observation 2 would be reflected in a table where there are no terms in 
cells 2A, 2B, 4A or 4B. Observation 3 does not require that there will 
be no terms in column 4 – but that any term in that column (a  term 
that both denominates and is denominated) must denominate and be 
denominated in respect of two different terms. Observation 4 requires 
that there will be no terms in cells 3A, 3C, 4A and 4C. Thus there is some 
overlap between what is excluded by observations 2-4.
II. THE TERM GOD
In applying this kind of framework to the divine realm, the constraints 
imposed by the faith (in a  broad sense that includes the teachings of 
the Church Fathers and Councils) are that among terms applying to 
the Godhead there be only one substance-term, no accident-terms, 
and that the Godhead exhibits simplicity. More specifically, God must 
be a  substance-term, nothing else applying to the Godhead can be 
a substance-term, God must not inhere as an accident in anything, and 
nothing can inhere in God as an accident. The notion of divine simplicity 
can be interpreted in more than one way.5 On one interpretation, it excludes 
5 Paul Thom, ‘Shades of Simplicity’, in Anselm Ramelow (ed.), God (Munich: 
Philosophia Verlag, 2013), pp. 323-340.
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any denomination within the Godhead. On another reading, it allows 
for denomination provided that this does not entail any dependency.6 
Other constraints include logical consistency and interpretive sense and 
comprehensiveness. In some developments the account will seek to give 
an ontological grounding for all the relevant predications. The aims of 
the present investigation are more modest: I  will confine attention to 
logical coherence. I will examine three different ways of introducing God 
into our framework.
III. A GOD UNRELATED BY INHERENCE AND DENOMINATION
The Categories scheme as it stands is ill-suited to representing a theology 
in which there is a substance-term in which no accident-terms inhere. 
If accidents are defined as what inheres, such a  theology requires that 
there be a  substance-term in row A  or row B. If the term God is not 
denominated from anything and nothing is denominated from God 
then this term must be in cell 1A. The term God thus does not stand to 
anything in a relation of inherence or a relation of denomination or in the 
converses of these relations. Such a term clearly satisfies the requirement 
of divine simplicity: at least it excludes any complexity that might be due 
to the relations of inherence and denomination.
The possibility of terms of type 1A is familiar to Aristotelians, 
though not because such terms form part of the Categories landscape. 
Negative terms like Non-man are of this type. To allow for such a term 
being a substance-term, the definition of substance-terms will have to be 
revised, dropping the requirement that a substance-term has something 
inhering in it.
The ontology of Aristotle’s Categories gives us an initial set of links 
(consequences and incompatibilities) between being a  substance-term 
and various configurations of inherence and denomination. The task of 
adapting this ontology to a set of theological requirements is similar to 
that of adapting a theory to accommodate recalcitrant data. One has to 
place an ordering on the initial set of links, which will determine which 
links can be abandoned ahead of others. The link with the weakest 
strength in a context requiring that there be a substance-term in which 
6 Paul Thom, The Logic of the Trinity: Augustine to Ockham (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2012).
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nothing inheres is the link between being a substance-term and being 
inhered in. If that link is broken, a substance-term can be redefi ned as 
one that (1) does not inhere, (2) is not denominated and (3) does not 
denominate. Th e fi rst condition excludes rows C and D. Th e second 
condition excludes columns 3 and 4. Th e third condition excludes 
columns 2 and 4. Th e remaining cells are 1A and 1B. Created substance-
terms belong in 1B, divine substance-terms in 1A.
 Not denominated Denominated 
Denominating Denominating Not denominating Not denominating 
Inhering 
Not inhering 
Not inhered in 
Not inhered in 
Inhered in 
Inhered in 
A 
B 
C 
D 
4 3 2 1 
Created substance 
Accident 
Denominative 
God 
Figure 3. Th e Categories ontology plus divine substance
An accident-term can still be defi ned as one that inheres, is not inhered 
in, is not denominated, and denominates.
Redefi ning substance-terms in this way brings us into confl ict with 
the fi rst of our observations about the Categories ontology, viz. that every 
term enters into either the domain or the converse domain of either 
inherence or denomination. Th e term God now appears as an exception 
to this observation. But this should not worry a hypothetical theologian 
who wants to fi t a term God into an ontology derived from the Categories. 
Aristotle’s theory of categories gives an account of substance-terms that 
admit of temporally alternating accident-terms  – an  account in terms 
of inherence, denomination, and a  couple of other relations. It is not 
surprising that all of the terms that are recognised in his account enter 
into these relations in one way or another. Once the account is extended 
so as to allow for other types of term, this restriction can no longer be 
expected to hold.
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IV. A SELF-RELATED GOD
Let us now suppose that we want to make God a term which does stand 
in one or other of our relations, but only in a refl exive way. Th is account 
again satisfi es the demand for divine simplicity, at least in the sense that 
it excludes any multiplication of substance-terms in the Godhead. Some 
thinkers, among them Bonaventure, have thought of God in this way, 
claiming that God is a self-denominating term:
Since quod est as well as quo est are found among lower things, by reason 
of which we have both concrete and abstract signifi cation (as when we 
say man and humanity), this is also our understanding in the divine 
realm, although we do not there understand these two to be diff erent. 
Accordingly, we signify abstractly by the name Deity and concretely by 
the name God. And thereby we give Him a name by which we signify quo 
est (and this is the essence), as well as quod est (and this is the substance).7
Th e terms God and divinity, denominated and denominating, have the 
same signifi cation. Th ese terms now appear in cell 4A.
 Not denominated Denominated 
Denominating Denominating Not denominating Not denominating 
Inhering 
Not inhering 
Not inhered in 
Not inhered in 
Inhered in 
Inhered in 
A 
B 
C 
D 
4 3 2 1 
Created substance 
Accident 
Accidental 
denominative 
God, i.e. 
divinity 
Figure 4. A self-related God
7 Bonaventure, Sent. I d.23 a.1 q.3. ... cum in communi in inferioribus inveniatur quod 
est et quo est, ratione cuius signifi catur in concretione et in abstractione, ut dicatur homo 
et humanitas: sic in divinis intelligimus, quamvis non intelligamus in diff erentia illa duo. 
Ideo et in abstractione signifi camus per hoc nomen deitas, et in concretione per hoc 
nomen Deus. Et ideo imposuimus ei nomen, quo signifi caretur ipsum quo est, et hoc est 
essentia; et ipsum quod est, et hoc est substantia ....
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In order for God to be counted as a substance-term in the same sense 
as non-divine substance-terms, the definition of a substance-term will 
have to be altered. This can be done by redefining a  substance-term 
as satisfying the following three conditions. (1) It does not inhere, (2) 
it is inhered in iff it is not denominated, (3) it is denominated iff it 
denominates. The first condition rules out rows C and D. The second 
rules out 1A, 1C, 2A, 2C, 3B, 4B, 3D, 4D. The third condition rules 
out columns 2 and 3. The remainder is 1B and 4A. 1B is the profile of 
a created substance-term, 4A of a divine substance-term.
The definition, however, may be too wide because it includes 
everything falling into cell 4A, including terms that are denominated by 
something other than themselves. The difficulty can be met by replacing 
the third condition by the specification that the term is not denominated 
by anything other than itself.
A  difficulty with this account arises from our earlier observation that 
there are no self-denominating terms in the Categories. Bonaventure is 
aware of this difficulty. In order to meet it he makes a distinction within 
the class of denominatives:
To compare one thing to another as informing it or denominating it, is 
not thereby to posit a diversity or distinction between them; for, Deity is 
compared in this way to God. To compare things as a principle and that 
of which it is the principle, is a different sort [of comparison]: this is to 
import a distinction.8
In other words, denomination has to be irreflexive if it is understood 
as treating the denominating term as a  principle from which the 
denominated term flows. But if we remove this element from the notion 
of denomination, there is no objection to a  term’s being denominated 
from itself. The definition of accidents is unaffected.
A  line of objection could be raised against Bonaventure’s idea of 
isolating an element in the notion of denomination which renders the 
relation irreflexive, and by abstraction generating from the relation 
a transform of it which lacks that element. First of all, in order to be sure 
that the abstracted relation is not itself irreflexive, one would need to be 
sure that one had removed all elements that would render it irreflexive. 
8 Bonaventure, Sent. 1.25.2: Quando aliquid comparatur ad aliud ut informans sive 
denominans, non ponitur propter hoc diversitas sive distinctio unius ad alterum; sic 
enim comparatur deitas ad Deum. Alio modo comparatur alterum sicut principium ad 
principiatum; et tunc de necessitate importatur distinctio.
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A sound argument leading to the desired conclusion requires a universal 
premise. Bonaventure does not address this point; and it is not at all clear 
how he, or anyone, could do so. Secondly, even if by this kind of process 
one could arrive at a suitably abstracted description of a non-reflexive 
relation, that would not yet prove that the description was satisfiable. One 
would still need a consistency (satisfiability) proof for the description.
In any case, Bonaventure’s specification of the content of the relation 
of denomination is too specific. Rather than being primarily a relation of 
what is principled to its principle, the relation of being denominated from 
what denominates it seems better described as that between something 
derivative and that from which it is derived. Given this, it’s clear that the 
conclusion at which Bonaventure wishes to arrive can indeed be arrived 
at. Since mutual inter-derivability is a  limiting case of derivability, 
and since denomination shorn of its linguistic marker is reducible to 
derivability, mutual denomination may be accepted as a limiting case of 
denomination. Derivability is a process of transformation in which each 
step is in accordance with a predetermined set of rules. If there is a single 
instance in which a  rule is reversible, then the derivability relation is 
non-reflexive. That doesn’t mean that all sub-relations of derivability are 
non-reflexive; but Bonaventure clearly thought that the specific kind of 
derivability that connects a denominated with a denominating term is 
non-reflexive.
Bonaventure and his contemporaries were happy to allow that a term 
for a  created substance, such as man, had a  corresponding abstract 
term humanity – even though such abstract terms do not figure in the 
Categories. A  full account of his views would have to take that into 
account. However, my present objective is not to analyse Bonaventure’s 
views, but to illustrate how our framework accounts for a term God as 
self-related by denomination.
V. A GOD RELATED TO OTHERS
Let us turn to a  third way of construing the term God  – as entering 
into relations of inherence or denomination with other terms. Gilbert 
of Poitiers, who died in 1154, is a  famous exponent of such a  view. 
Gilbert holds that God and divinity have different significations and are 
connected by a non-reflexive relation of denomination. On the face of it, 
such a view conflicts with divine simplicity. But Gilbert has a response to 
this charge, which we will see presently.
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Gilbert radically overhauls the conceptual scheme of the Categories. 
Instead of speaking of the relation of denomination he uses the opposition 
between quo est and quod est (or alternatively, that between a subsistence 
and a subsistent):
So he says Being, i.e. the subsistence which is in a  subsistent, is 
different from what-is, i.e. the subsistent in which the subsistence 
is: for example, corporeality and body, humanity and man.9
Both types of term can stand for substances.
For not only a subsistent but also a subsistence is called ‘substance’ in 
that both stand under accidents, though for different reasons.10
Gilbert also has a novel way of conceiving of the Aristotelian relation of 
inherence. He understands inherence to be the relative product of two 
relations, the first of which relates an accident-term to a subsistence, while 
the second relates that subsistence to a subsistent. He calls the former 
relation accompaniment, the second being the relation of denomination. 
Thus, instead of saying that colour inheres in body, Gilbert wants to say 
that colour accompanies corporeality which denominates body.
He explains the relation of accompaniment as follows:
And we say that colour and line follow corporality, rather than corporality 
following colour and line. For they don’t cause corporality; it causes 
them. It is the very being of a body; but they accompany it in a body. So 
it exists at first, after which it is a body (for it is indeed their substance).
They are accidents first of corporality, and through it of body. For they 
stand under it – both corporality (which they accompany) and body (in 
which they inhere).11
9 Gilbert of Poitiers, Expositio in Boecium librum De Bonorum Ebdomade §35. Ait 
ergo: Diuersum est esse i.e. subsistentia, que est in subsistente, et id quod est i.e. 
subsistens in quo est subsistentia: ut corporalitas et corpus, humanitas et homo.
10 Gilbert of Poitiers, Expositio in Boecium librum primum De Trinitate 4 §99. Non 
enim subsistens tantum sed etiam subsistentia appellatur ‘substantia’ eo quod utraque 
accidentibus, diuersis tamen rationibus, substant.
11 Gilbert of Poitiers, Expositio in Boecium librum primum De Trinitate 4 §26. Et 
dicimus quod non corporalitas colorem aut lineam sed color et linea corporalitatem 
secuntur. Non enim hec corporalitatis sed horum corporalitas causa est. Qua ratione illa 
corporis est esse: hec uero in eodem corpore illi adsunt. Ideo primum illa, deinde quod 
ea corpus est, uera ratione est horum substancia: hec uero primum corporalitatis et per 
eam corporis Taccidencia. His enim uere substat et corporalitas, cui assunt, et corpus 
cui insunt.
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The language Gilbert uses here suggests that he views the relation of 
accompaniment as holding only when that which is accompanied 
provides a metaphysical substratum for that which accompanies.
As a  result of his innovations, Gilbert is committed, even in 
conceptualising the created world, to terms of types 2B and 3B, neither 
of which is found in the Categories. 2B are not denominated but do 
denominate. 3B are denominated and do not denominate. 3B is how 
substance-terms appear in a language that admits abstract terms derived 
from them. 2B is how those abstract terms appear in such a language.
Gilbert treats divinity and God as being of types 2A and 3A. This 
treatment is perfectly analogous to his treatment of the abstracts of 
created substance-terms and the created substance-terms themselves. 
However, the created substance-term is inhered in while the divine 
one is not, and the abstract created substance-term is accompanied by 
something while the abstract divine one is.
For that by which He is – the essence (which in Greek is called ousia) – 
cannot be non-simple. Nor can something other in it accompany the 
same essence, by which it is. For God would not be simple if His essence 
were established from several essences, or if forms accompanied the 
same in it, of which either God Himself truly was (or His essence were 
with reason said to be) the subjected matter.12
Even though God is not the same as Divinity, there is nothing other than 
Divinity by which God is, and Divinity is only because God is from it.13 
This is Gilbert’s reinterpretation of what divine simplicity requires.
We already know of terms that satisfy the profile of 3A, namely 
accidental denominatives. As for 2A, a term of this type must not inhere 
in anything nor have anything inhering in it, not be denominated 
by anything but must denominate something. In other words, such 
a  term does not enter into inherence relations in any way, and enters 
into denomination relations only by denominating not by being 
denominated. There doesn’t appear to be anything ruling out such a state 
12 Gilbert of Poitiers, Expositio in Boecium librum primum De Trinitate 2.37: Neque 
enim ea, qua ipse est, essencia – que Grece usia dicitur – potest esse non simplex. Neque 
in eo eidem essencie adesse aliud aliquid potest quo ipse sit. Non enim Deus simplex 
esset si uel eius essencia constaret ex multis essenciis uel eidem adessent forme in illo 
quarum uel ipse Deus uere esset uel eius essencia ratione diceretur ‘subiecta materia’.
13 Gilbert of Poitiers, Expositio in Boecium librum primum De Trinitate I,2,89. Non 
enim est a diuinitate aliud quo Deus sit. Nec est unde diuinitas ipsa sit nisi quod ea 
Deus est.
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of affairs: the fact that A denominates B doesn’t require that something 
should denominate A (we know this from the case of accident-terms). 
Nor of itself does it require that A should inhere in anything (it seems 
that any abstract term denominates, but privative abstract terms, such as 
blindness, do not inhere). Nor does A’s denominating something entail 
that something should inhere in A (again, in the case of accident-terms 
we know that they denominate, but do not have anything inhering in 
them – at least, this is true of accident-terms of the highest order).
On Gilbert’s reckoning God turns out to be a denominative just like 
created accidental denominates such as brave (but different from created 
substance-terms). At first sight this seems unacceptable. However, even 
within the slender resources to which we have limited ourselves, we can 
draw a distinction between two types of denominative. Terms like brave 
are denominated from accident-terms, the term God is denominated 
from the non-accidental term Divinity. Or, confining ourselves to what 
can be expressed solely through inherence and denomination: brave is 
denominated from a  2C-term not from a  3A-term; with God it is the 
other way round.
Another apparent difficulty with Gilbert’s idea of God is that this 
term is denominated but is not inhered in  – contrary, so it seems, to 
one of our observations about the Categories, viz. the observation that in 
the Categories what denominates something inheres in something. But 
actually, the objection is misconceived. To say that what denominates 
something inheres in something is not to say that what denominates 
A  inheres in A. And in the Categories what is denominated is never 
what is inhered in. The denomination relation connects what is abstract 
with what is concrete. The inherence relation connects what is abstract 
with a substance-term. So, even in the Categories it is not the case that 
every denominated term is inhered in. So, from the point of view of the 
Categories there is nothing untoward about God being denominated but 
not inhered in.
A third difficulty concerns Gilbert’s construal of divinity. Contrary to 
what we observe in the Categories, this term denominates but does not 
inhere. Its failure to inhere follows, in Gilbert’s view, from the fact that 
it is not an accident-term. However, the coextension of denominating 
and inhering terms that we observe in the Categories does not appear 
to be have a principled basis. If we assume that what inheres must be 
an accident-term, we can argue that what inheres must denominate. For, 
an accident-term must denominate: all accident-terms are abstract, and 
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thus can be made concrete, in which case they denominate some term. 
So there is a reason why what inheres must denominate. But there doesn’t 
seem to be any reason why, conversely, what denominates must inhere. 
Rather, any term – even a term beyond the limits of what is considered in 
the Categories (e.g. terms for negations, privations, compounds, Platonic 
Forms) – so long as it is abstract, must denominate. But terms falling 
outside the range of what is considered in the Categories cannot inhere, 
because they are not accident-terms.
Gilbert’s innovations necessitate a  revision of the definition of 
substance-terms. A substance-term satisfies the following two conditions 
(which are the first and third of the three conditions defining substance-
terms in a  Bonaventure-style scheme). (1) It does not inhere, (2) it is 
denominated iff it denominates. The first condition excludes rows C and 
D. The second condition excludes columns 1 and 4. What remains are 
the cells 2A, 3A, 2B, 3B. These are the profiles respectively of the abstract 
and concrete expressions for divine substance-terms, and the abstract 
and concrete expressions for created substance-terms.
VI. WHAT DOES THIS TYPE OF ANALYSIS SHOW?
The type of analysis used in this paper may have a use in reconstructing 
the conceptual schemes that structure certain strands of medieval 
theological thought. It may even help in understanding the changes that 
are evident when one of these schemes gets supplanted by another.
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